Germany , direct democracy , local public finances
Abstract:
Recently a wide and empirically-backed consensus has emerged arguing that
direct democratic control over government's spending decisions through initiatives
and referenda constrains government size. But what happens if budgetary matters
are excluded from the voters' right of the initiative? I study this question by extending
the analysis to German direct democracy reforms of the mid-1990s, which
granted voters wide opportunities to initiate referenda on local issues, but neither
the right, nor the responsibility of voting on the implied costs of these initiatives.
By exploiting a novel dataset containing detailed information on close to 2,300 voter
initiatives in the population of around 13,000 German municipalities from 2002 to
2009, I show that in this sample { and in contrast to the Swiss and US evidence
{ direct democracy causes an expansion of local government size by up to 8% in
annual per capita expenditure and revenue per observed initiative (on economic
projects). The main empirical challenge is the endogeneity of voters' unobserved
preferences which simultaneously determine both their propensity towards exploiting
their direct democracy rights and their preferences for local public policies. To
address this issue I use state- and municipality-varying legislative thresholds on the
minimum number of signatures required to initiate referenda and the time to collect
these signatures as strong and exogenous instruments for observed initiatives.
Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.
![[img]](https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
Search Authors in