The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals

DOI:	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.012
URL:	http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S...
Document Type:	Article
Year of publication:	2013
The title of a journal, publication series:	Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization : JEBO
Volume:	93
Issue number:	9
Page range:	266-272
Place of publication:	Amsterdam [u.a.]
Publishing house:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0167-2681
Publication language:	English
Institution:	Business School > ABWL, Personalmanagement u. Führung (Biemann 2013-)
Subject:	330 Economics
Classification:	JEL: C91 , C92 , D82 , G20 , J30 , M52,
Keywords (English):	Deception , Team incentives , Experiment , Financial advice , Misadvising , Sender-receiver game
Abstract:	In an experiment with professionals from the financial services sector, we investigate the impact of a team incentive scheme on the recommendation quality of investment products when advisors benefit from advising lower quality products. Experimental results reveal that, when group affiliation is strong, inferior products are recommended significantly more often under team incentives than under individual incentives.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

BASE: Danilov, Anastasia ; Biemann, Torsten ; Kring, Thorn ; Sliwka, Dirk

Google Scholar: Danilov, Anastasia ; Biemann, Torsten ; Kring, Thorn ; Sliwka, Dirk

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