Asymmetric Information , Prosocial Behavior , Efficiency Concern , Inequality Aversion , Dictator Game
Abstract:
In most laboratory experiments concerning prosocial behavior subjects are fully informed how their decision influences the payoff of other players.
Outside the laboratory, however, individuals typically have to decide without such detailed knowledge. To asses the effect of information asymmetries on prosocial behavior, we conduct a laboratory experiment with a simple
non-strategic interaction. A dictator has only limited knowledge about the benefits his prosocial action generates for a recipient. We observe subjects with heterogenous social preferences. While under symmetric information
only individuals with the same type of preferences transfer, under asymmetric
information different types transfer at the same time. As a consequence and the main finding of our experiment, uninformed dictators behave more prosocially than informed dictators.
Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
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