Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program


Hoang, Cung Truong ; Hüschelrath, Kai ; Laitenberger, Ulrich ; Smuda, Florian


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URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/36919
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-369191
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2014
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 14-043
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: L41 , K21,
Keywords (English): Competition policy , cartels , leniency , European Union
Abstract: We empirically investigate the determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program. Applying a data set consisting of 442 firm groups that participated in 76 cartels decided by the European Commission between 2000 and 2011, we find that the probability of a firm becoming the chief witness increases with its character as repeat offender, the size of the expected basic fine, the number of countries active in one group as well as the size of the firm’s share in the cartelized market. Our results have important implications for an effective prosecution of anti-cartel law infringers.




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