On the performance of rule-based contribution schemes under endowment heterogeneity

Kesternich, Martin ; Lange, Andreas ; Sturm, Bodo

dp14055.pdf - Published

Download (668kB)

URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/37033
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-370330
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2014
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 14-055
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: C72 , C92 , H41,
Keywords (English): Public good , institutions , minimum contribution rules , cooperation , endowment heterogeneity
Abstract: We experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a repeated 4-player public goods game with endowment heterogeneity and compare them to a VCM, distinguishing between a random- and an effort-based allocation of endowments. We find that endowment heterogeneities limit the efficiency gains from minimum contribution rules under random allocation. Under effort-based allocations, substantial efficiency gains relative to a VCM occur, though being largely driven by significant reductions of contributions in VCM. By apparently influencing the perception of fair burden sharing, the endowment allocation procedure crucially impacts voluntary contributions under VCM, while the rule-based mechanisms generate stable efficiency levels, even though endowment heterogeneity substantially limits the ability of rule-based mechanisms to achieve the potential efficiency gains.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

Metadata export


+ Search Authors in

+ Download Statistics

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail

Actions (login required)

Show item Show item