Law and economics , antitrust policy , cartels , appeals , European Union
Abstract:
The duration of appellate court proceedings is an important determinant of the efficiency of a
court system. We use data of 234 firm groups that participated in 63 cartels convicted by the
European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to investigate the determinants of the duration
of the subsequent one- or two-stage appeals process. We find that while the speed of the firststage
appellate court decision depends on the court’s appeals-related workload, the
complexity of the case, the degree of cooperation by the firms involved and the clarity of the
applied rules and regulations, the second-stage appellate court proceedings appear to be
largely unaffected by those drivers. We take our empirical results to derive conclusions for
both firms that plan to file an appeal as well as public policy makers.
Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
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