Law and economics , appeals , antitrust policy , cartels , European Union
Abstract:
The appeals process – whereby the losing party of an administrative or judicial decision can
seek reconsideration of their arguments before a higher institution – is an important
mechanism to correct legal errors and to improve existing laws and regulations. We use data
of 467 firm groups that participated in 88 cartels convicted by the European Commission
between 2000 and 2012 to study both the characteristics of firm groups filing an appeal and
the factors that determine their successfulness in terms of fine reduction. Applying discrete
choice models and a two-stage hurdle model, we find that while some characteristics – such
as the size and financial condition of the firm group or the clarity of fine guidelines – only
affect the probability to file an appeal, other factors such as the size of the fine imposed in
connection to characteristics as ringleader, repeat offender or leniency applicant influence
both the probability and the success of an appeal. We take our empirical results to derive
conclusions for both firms and public policy makers.
Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.
![[img]](https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
Search Authors in