Information Disclosure and Consumer Awareness

Li, Sanxi ; Peitz, Martin ; Zhao, Xiaojian

Vorschau

PDF
Li,_Peitz,_Zhao_14-28.pdf - Veröffentlichte Version
Download (458kB)

URL:	https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/37377
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-373775
Dokumenttyp:	Arbeitspapier
Erscheinungsjahr:	2014
Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:	Working Paper Series
Band/Volume:	14-28
Ort der Veröffentlichung:	Mannheim
Sprache der Veröffentlichung:	Englisch
Einrichtung:	Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre > Industrieökonomik, Wettbewerbspolitik u. Regulierung (Peitz 2007-)
MADOC-Schriftenreihe:	Department of Economics > Working Paper Series
Fachgebiet:	330 Wirtschaft
Fachklassifikation:	JEL: L51 , M38,
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch):	Information disclosure , informative advertising , targeted advertising , consumer awareness , behavioral bias , non-common prior , consumer protection , behavioral industrial organization
Abstract:	Whether consumers are aware of potentially adverse product effects is key to private and social incentives to disclose information about undesirable product characteristics. In a monopoly model with a mix of aware and unaware consumers, a larger share of unaware consumers makes information disclosure less likely to occur. Since the firm is not interested in releasing information to unaware consumers, a more precise targeting technology that allows the firm to better keep unaware consumers in the dark leads to more disclosure. A regulator may want to intervene in this market and impose mandatory disclosure rules.