Corporate taxation , organizational design , survey data
Abstract:
The allocation of management and control in the business decision process
finds expression in the coordination intensity between agents in the firm. We
develop and test a theory, based on the organizational design literature, for the
intensity in which the tax department strives to coordinate with managers from
other business units in order to intervene in investment decisions. Our theoret-
ical considerations predict that R&D intensity is an important determinant of
the tax department's role. Using data from a confidential survey taken in 2012
of top financial and tax managers of very large multinational companies, repre-
senting 8% of business R&D spending in the OECD, we indeed find supporting
evidence that in R&D intensive multinational firms the tax department operates
more as a controller than as a manager. In particular, tax departments of R&D
intensive firms make less tax planning effort, are less ambitious to minimize the
tax burden of the firm, are later involved in the decision-making process of a new
investment project, but are more likely to have a veto right in the decision on
a new investment project as compared to less R&D intensive firms. Conditional
on R&D intensity, however, the level of intangible assets in the firm is associ-
ated with more tax planning efforts and ambitions. Our results are statistically
significant and robust towards several sensitivity checks.
Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.
![[img]](https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
Search Authors in