This contribution highlights the complex causes of the European debt crisis and discusses available options for a solution. Relevant causes included are debt incentives which are effective permanently, the lacking optimality of the European currency area and deficient institutional debt brakes. Furthermore, the acute dimension of the crisis as a self-fulfilling crisis of confidence with a highly destructive potential is stressed. All solution strategies face the challenge that a self-fulfilling confidence crisis cannot be contained through an improvement of long-run fundamentals alone. Based on this analysis the crisis management is assessed. One insight is that the often criticized cautious and muddling-through approach towards a permanent solution is adequate. In contrast to that, allegedly courageous solutions like the introduction of eurobonds or the quick exclusion of crisis countries from the euro zone are unconvincing. Links to the economic literature of the early 1990s prove that the risk of a debt crisis has clearly been identified and analyzed as a particular risk of the European Monetary Union well before its start.
Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
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