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The political economy of corporate tax harmonization - Why do European politicians (dis)like minimum tax rates?
Osterloh, Steffen
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Heinemann, Friedrich
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DOI:
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.09.002
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URL:
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http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S...
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Dokumenttyp:
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Zeitschriftenartikel
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Erscheinungsjahr:
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2013
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Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:
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European Journal of Political Economy
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Band/Volume:
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29
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Seitenbereich:
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18-37
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Ort der Veröffentlichung:
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Amsterdam [u.a.]
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Verlag:
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Elsevier
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ISSN:
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0176-2680
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Sprache der Veröffentlichung:
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Englisch
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Einrichtung:
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Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > SFB 884
Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
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Fachgebiet:
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330 Wirtschaft
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Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch):
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Company taxation , Tax harmonization , Political economy , European Parliament
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Abstract:
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Setting minimum tax rates is a well discussed way of mitigating pressure from tax competition. This paper investigates which motives shape the support for a minimum corporate tax among politicians. We make use of a unique data base: a survey among members of the European parliament. Our results confirm that the politicians' ideology as well as individual characteristics such as educational background exert a major influence. Moreover, several predictions regarding national interests are derived from various standard tax competition models. These hypotheses are partly supported by the data; in particular, different national preferences towards social equality shape the support. A comparison with survey results from the German Bundestag reveals that German politicians on the national level do not show different attitudes towards tax rate harmonization.
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 | Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie. |
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