The political economy of corporate tax harmonization - Why do European politicians (dis)like minimum tax rates?


Osterloh, Steffen ; Heinemann, Friedrich



DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.09.002
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S...
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2013
The title of a journal, publication series: European Journal of Political Economy
Volume: 29
Page range: 18-37
Place of publication: Amsterdam [u.a.]
Publishing house: Elsevier
ISSN: 0176-2680
Publication language: English
Institution: Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > SFB 884
Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
Subject: 330 Economics
Keywords (English): Company taxation , Tax harmonization , Political economy , European Parliament
Abstract: Setting minimum tax rates is a well discussed way of mitigating pressure from tax competition. This paper investigates which motives shape the support for a minimum corporate tax among politicians. We make use of a unique data base: a survey among members of the European parliament. Our results confirm that the politicians' ideology as well as individual characteristics such as educational background exert a major influence. Moreover, several predictions regarding national interests are derived from various standard tax competition models. These hypotheses are partly supported by the data; in particular, different national preferences towards social equality shape the support. A comparison with survey results from the German Bundestag reveals that German politicians on the national level do not show different attitudes towards tax rate harmonization.




Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




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