From Pre-electoral Policy Choice to Post-electoral Policy Implementation
Zudenkova, Galina
URL:
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https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/do...
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Weitere URL:
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http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1844504
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Dokumenttyp:
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Arbeitspapier
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Erscheinungsjahr:
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2014
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Ort der Veröffentlichung:
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Mannheim
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Sprache der Veröffentlichung:
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Englisch
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Einrichtung:
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Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre > VWL, Finanzwissenschaft (Juniorprofessur) (Zudenkova 2012-2019)
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Fachgebiet:
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330 Wirtschaft
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Abstract:
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This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition in which a politician is responsible for two tasks -- policy choice and policy implementation. The policy outcome is determined by the politician's pre-electoral choice of policy and a costly post-electoral effort required for implementing the selected policy. I show that two policy-motivated candidates adjust their pre-electoral promises anticipating a costly post-electoral effort needed for bringing those promises to life. In particular, each candidate realizes that if elected, he will put a costly effort into the policy implementation, and so does not want to compromise on a policy issue before the election. My results predict policy divergence in equilibrium and, for some parameter values, existence of equilibrium with asymmetric electoral platforms.
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Zusätzliche Informationen:
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Version May 2015 s. Weitere URL
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| Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie. |
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