From Pre-electoral Policy Choice to Post-electoral Policy Implementation


Zudenkova, Galina



URL: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/do...
Additional URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1844504
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2014
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > VWL, Finanzwissenschaft (Juniorprofessur) (Zudenkova 2013-)
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition in which a politician is responsible for two tasks -- policy choice and policy implementation. The policy outcome is determined by the politician's pre-electoral choice of policy and a costly post-electoral effort required for implementing the selected policy. I show that two policy-motivated candidates adjust their pre-electoral promises anticipating a costly post-electoral effort needed for bringing those promises to life. In particular, each candidate realizes that if elected, he will put a costly effort into the policy implementation, and so does not want to compromise on a policy issue before the election. My results predict policy divergence in equilibrium and, for some parameter values, existence of equilibrium with asymmetric electoral platforms.
Additional information: Version May 2015 s. Weitere URL

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




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Zudenkova, Galina (2014) From Pre-electoral Policy Choice to Post-electoral Policy Implementation. Mannheim [Working paper]


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