Competition over Redistribution


Zudenkova, Galina



URL: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/do...
Additional URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2069977
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2014
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > VWL, Finanzwissenschaft (Juniorprofessur) (Zudenkova 2013-)
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: This paper analyzes a game of redistributive politics in which targeted spending arises as a result of the competition over resources among jurisdictions. I build a political agency model in which a vote-maximizing politician is subject to the oversight of distinct constituencies. Voters' demand for local public goods in these constituencies is driven down by the competition among them. I characterize the unique equilibrium of this game. In the equilibrium, in order to make his constituency an attractive choice for federal spending, each voter demands somewhat less spending than what he actually receives. As a result, the voters tend to be satisfied with the redistributive policies of the incumbent. The incumbent is then quite likely to win more than half of the votes.
Additional information: Version November 2015 s. Weitere URL

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




+ Citation Example and Export

Zudenkova, Galina (2014) Competition over Redistribution. Mannheim [Working paper]


+ Search Authors in

+ Page Views

Hits per month over past year

Detailed information



You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail


Actions (login required)

Show item Show item