Does exchange of information between tax authorities influence multinationals' use of tax havens?

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URL:	https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/38821
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-388217
Document Type:	Working paper
Year of publication:	2015
The title of a journal, publication series:	ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume:	15-015
Place of publication:	Mannheim
Publication language:	English
Institution:	Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series:	Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject:	330 Economics
Classification:	JEL: F21 , F23 , H87,
Keywords (English):	Tax havens , tax information exchange agreements , location decisions , international taxation
Abstract:	Since the mid-1990s, countries offering tax systems that facilitate international tax avoidance and evasion have been facing growing political pressure to comply with the internationally agreed standards of exchange of tax information. Using data of German investments in tax havens, we find evidence that the conclusion of a bilateral tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) is associated with fewer operations in tax havens and the number of German affiliates has on average decreased by 46% compared to a control group. This suggests that firms invest in tax havens not only for their low tax rates but also for the secrecy they offer.

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BASE: Braun, Julia ; Weichenrieder, Alfons J.

Google Scholar: Braun, Julia ; Weichenrieder, Alfons J.

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