How creative are you? - An experimental study on self-selection in a competitive incentive scheme for creative performance


Bradler, Christiane


[img]
Preview
PDF
dp15021.pdf - Published

Download (490kB)

URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/38866
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-388667
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2015
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 15-021
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: C91 , D03 , J33 , M52,
Keywords (English): Performance pay , tournaments , selection , sorting , creativity , experiment
Abstract: Economic theory suggests that performance pay may serve as an effective screening device to attract productive agents. The existing evidence on the self-selection of agents is largely limited to job tasks where performance is driven by routine, well-defined procedures. This study presents evidence for a creative task and studies how agents self-select into a tournament-based scheme vs. a fixed pay scheme. The experiment allows for the measurement of creative productivity, risk preferences, self-assessments, gender, and other socio-economic characteristics such as the Big Five personality traits. Results show that the two payment schemes systematically attract agents with different characteristics. However, results differ fundamentally from previously found patterns. Agents did not self-select into the tournament scheme according to their creative productivity, but only according to their risk attitudes and self-assessments. The reason for the absence of a selection of the most creative agents into the tournament is that there exist substantial misjudgments of relative creative productivity. Further evidence from a representative German survey data set provides additional support for the experimental results suggesting external validity.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




+ Citation Example and Export

Bradler, Christiane (2015) How creative are you? - An experimental study on self-selection in a competitive incentive scheme for creative performance. Open Access ZEW Discussion Papers Mannheim 15-021 [Working paper]
[img]
Preview


+ Search Authors in

+ Download Statistics

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics



You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail


Actions (login required)

Show item Show item