Sovereign insolvency procedure , European unemployment insurance , euro area debt crisis
Abstract:
This contribution develops a blueprint for a European fiscal union. The proposal addresses the
shortcomings of most other reform designs which do not offer a solution for insolvent or noncooperative
euro countries. We suggest a design which combines fiscal insurance with an
orderly procedure to restructure the debt of an insolvent euro member. We show that fiscal
insurance and a sovereign insolvency procedure are no contradiction but, on the contrary, mutually
enforcing: An effective fiscal insurance helps to limit the stability risks involved in the
implementation of an insolvency regime for sovereigns. And vice versa, a well-defined insolvency
procedure reduces the danger that a fiscal capacity motivated as an insurance against
transitory asymmetric shocks degenerates into a permanent transfer system. Moreover, we
show that both elements are a helpful complement for the functioning of the European banking
union and the new European fiscal governance.
Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.
![[img]](https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
Search Authors in