Infinitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers

Goldlücke, Susanne ; Kranz, Sebastian

Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2012
The title of a journal, publication series: Journal of Economic Theory : JET
Volume: 147
Issue number: 3
Page range: 1191-1221
Place of publication: Amsterdam [u.a.]
Publishing house: Elsevier
ISSN: 0022-0531
Publication language: Other
Institution: School of Law and Economics > VWL, Angewandte Mikroökonomische Theorie (Juniorprofessur) (Goldlücke 2011-2014)
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. It is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments. A fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

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