Rent sharing to control non-cartel supply in the German cement market


Harrington Jr., Joseph E. ; Hüschelrath, Kai ; Laitenberger, Ulrich


[img]
Preview
PDF
dp16025.pdf - Published

Download (303kB)

URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/40897
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-408971
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2016
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 16-025
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: L41 , K21,
Keywords (English): Collusion , cartel , non-cartel supply , cement , distribution channels , intermediary
Abstract: A challenge for many cartels is avoiding a destabilizing increase in non-cartel supply in response to having raised price. In the case of the German cement cartel that operated over 1991-2002, the primary source of non-cartel supply was imports from Eastern European cement manufacturers. Industry sources have claimed that the cartel sought to control imports by sharing rents with intermediaries in order to discourage them from sourcing foreign supply. Specifically, cartel members would allow an intermediary to issue the invoice for a transaction and charge a fee even though the output went directly from the cartel member’s plant to the customer. We investigate this claim by first developing a theory of collusive pricing that takes account of the option of bribing intermediaries. The theory predicts that the cement cartel members are more likely to share rents with an intermediary when the nearest Eastern European plant is closer and there is more Eastern European capacity outside of the control of the cartel. Estimating a logit model that predicts when a cartel member sells through an intermediary, the empirical analysis supports both predictions.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




+ Citation Example and Export

Harrington Jr., Joseph E. ; Hüschelrath, Kai ; Laitenberger, Ulrich (2016) Rent sharing to control non-cartel supply in the German cement market. Open Access ZEW Discussion Papers Mannheim 16-025 [Working paper]
[img]
Preview


+ Search Authors in

+ Download Statistics

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics



You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail


Actions (login required)

Show item Show item