Democracy and compliance in public goods games


Gallier, Carlo


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URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/43575
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-435755
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2017
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 17-038
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: C91 , D02 , D72 , K42,
Keywords (English): Laboratory experiment , public good , democracy , endogenous institutions , voting , contribution rule , compliance
Abstract: I investigate if, how, and why the effect of a contribution rule in a public goods game depends on how it is implemented: endogenously chosen or externally imposed. The rule prescribes full contributions to the public good backed by a nondeterrent sanction for those who do not comply. My experimental design allows me to disentangle to what extent the effect of the contribution rule under democracy is driven by self-selection of treatments, information transmitted via the outcome of the referendum, and democracy per se. In case treatments are endogenously chosen via a democratic decision-making process, the contribution rule significantly increases contributions to the public good. However, democratic participation does not affect participants’ contribution behavior directly, after controlling for self-selection of treatments and the information transmitted by voting.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Gallier, Carlo (2017) Democracy and compliance in public goods games. Open Access ZEW Discussion Papers Mannheim 17-038 [Working paper]
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