Productivity and distribution effects of codetermination in an efficient bargaining model


Kraft, Kornelius


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URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/43596
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-435964
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2017
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 17-039
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: L22 , L23 , J52 , J53,
Keywords (English): Codetermination , productivity , wage-bill share , bargaining
Abstract: Codetermination can be regarded as an extreme regulatory intervention of the legislator in the labor market which might affect the efficiency of production and the bargaining power of labor. Based on a model that covers both efficient bargaining and employment bargaining a simple equation is derived that is suited to empirical testing. The empirical test is based on German data and includes years before and after the extension of German codetermination law in 1976. The estimates determine the productivity of labor and relative bargaining power of capital and labor. It turns out that codetermination does not affect productivity, but leads to a significant increase in workers’ bargaining power and the distribution of rents.
Additional information: Umschlagtitel: Productivity and distribution effects of codetermination in an efficient bargaining




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