Tax morale and the role of social norms and reciprocity : evidence from a randomized survey experiment


Doerrenberg, Philipp ; Peichl, Andreas


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URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/43630
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-436307
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2017
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 17-045
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: H20 , H32 , H50 , C93,
Keywords (English): Tax compliance , tax evasion , intrinsic motivations , tax morale , social norms , reciprocity
Abstract: We present the first randomized survey experiment in the context of tax compliance to assess the role of social norms and reciprocity for intrinsic tax morale. We find that participants in a reciprocity treatment have significantly higher tax morale than those in a social-norm treatment. This suggests that a potential backfire effect of social norms is outweighed if the consequences of violating the social norm are made salient. We further document the anatomy of intrinsic motivations for tax compliance and present first evidence that previously found gender effects in tax morale are not driven by differences in risk preferences.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Doerrenberg, Philipp ; Peichl, Andreas (2017) Tax morale and the role of social norms and reciprocity : evidence from a randomized survey experiment. Open Access ZEW Discussion Papers Mannheim 17-045 [Working paper]
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