Assigning an unpleasant task without payment

Goldlücke, Susanne ; Tröger, Thomas

18-02_Goldlücke, Tröger.pdf - Published

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URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-440766
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2018
The title of a journal, publication series: Working Paper Series
Volume: 18-02
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Wirtschaftstheorie (Tröger 2010-)
MADOC publication series: Department of Economics > Working Paper Series
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D82 , D71 , D62 , H41,
Keywords (English): Volunteering , public good provision , mechanism design
Abstract: How should a group of people decide to allocate a task that has to be done but is not adequately rewarded? This paper finds an optimal mechanism for the private provision of a public service in an environment without monetary transfers. All members of the group have the same cost of providing the service, but some individuals are better suited for the task than others. The optimal mechanism is a threshold rule that assigns the task randomly among volunteers if enough volunteers come forward, and otherwise assigns the task among the non-volunteers.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

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