Incentive regulation : evidence from German electricity networks


Hellwig, Michael ; Schober, Dominik ; Cabral, Luís


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URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/44674
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-446741
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2018
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 18-010
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: K23 , L51 , L94 , L98 , D24 , D82,
Keywords (English): Regulation , ratchet effect , electricity utilities , difference-in-differences , efficiency analysis
Abstract: We propose a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to estimate the impact of incentives on cost reduction. We show theoretically, and estimate empirically, that German electricity distribution system operators (DSOs) incur higher costs when subject to a lower-powered regulation mechanism. The difference is particularly significant (about 7%) for firms in the upper quartile of the efficiency distribution, a pattern which is consistent with the pooling of types under the threat of ratcheting.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Hellwig, Michael ; Schober, Dominik ; Cabral, Luís (2018) Incentive regulation : evidence from German electricity networks. Open Access ZEW Discussion Papers Mannheim 18-010 [Working paper]
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