Two-class voting : a mechanism for conflict resolution in bankruptcy?

DOI:	https://doi.org/10.1257/000282802762024584
URL:	https://ssrn.com/abstract=209430
Weitere URL:	http://www.jstor.org/stable/3083258
Dokumenttyp:	Zeitschriftenartikel
Erscheinungsjahr:	2002
Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:	American Economic Review : AER
Band/Volume:	92
Heft/Issue:	5
Seitenbereich:	1448-1471
Ort der Veröffentlichung:	Nashville, Tenn.
Verlag:	American Economic Assoc.
ISSN:	0002-8282 , 1944-7981
Sprache der Veröffentlichung:	Englisch
Einrichtung:	Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > ABWL u. Corporate Finance (Maug 2006-)
Fachgebiet:	330 Wirtschaft
Abstract:	We discuss two-class voting procedures where voters are divided into classes and a separate majority is required in each class. Examples include Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings and some political mechanisms. We investigate how voting mechanisms aggregate information dispersed among voters when voters have conflicts of interests as well as different information regarding a proposal. We find that two-class voting provides a significant improvement over one-class voting in all situations where voters have significant conflicts of interests, and where the voters are relatively evenly divided between interest groups. However, two-class voting is inefficient absent conflicts of interests.