Two-class voting : a mechanism for conflict resolution in bankruptcy?


Maug, Ernst ; Yilmaz, Bilge



DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/000282802762024584
URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=209430
Additional URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3083258
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2002
The title of a journal, publication series: American Economic Review : AER
Volume: 92
Issue number: 5
Page range: 1448-1471
Place of publication: Nashville, TN
Publishing house: American Economic Assoc.
ISSN: 0002-8282
Publication language: English
Institution: Business School > ABWL u. Corporate Finance (Maug)
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: We discuss two-class voting procedures where voters are divided into classes and a separate majority is required in each class. Examples include Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings and some political mechanisms. We investigate how voting mechanisms aggregate information dispersed among voters when voters have conflicts of interests as well as different information regarding a proposal. We find that two-class voting provides a significant improvement over one-class voting in all situations where voters have significant conflicts of interests, and where the voters are relatively evenly divided between interest groups. However, two-class voting is inefficient absent conflicts of interests.

Dieser Datensatz wurde nicht während einer Tätigkeit an der Universität Mannheim veröffentlicht, dies ist eine Externe Publikation.




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