Drilled to obey? Ex-military CEOs and financial misconduct

DOI:	https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2946
URL:	https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/s...
Weitere URL:	https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326848325...
Dokumenttyp:	Zeitschriftenartikel
Erscheinungsjahr:	2018
Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:	Strategic Management Journal
Band/Volume:	39
Heft/Issue:	11
Seitenbereich:	2943-2964
Ort der Veröffentlichung:	Chichester [u.a.]
Verlag:	Wiley
ISSN:	0143-2095 , 1097-0266
Sprache der Veröffentlichung:	Englisch
Einrichtung:	Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > ABWL, Personalmanagement u. Führung (Biemann 2013-)
Fachgebiet:	330 Wirtschaft
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch):	backdating , board oversight , CEOs , fraud , military
Abstract:	Research Summary: We examine the influence of CEOs' military background on financial misconduct using two distinctive datasets. First, we make use of accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAER) issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which contain intentional and substantial cases of financial fraud. Second, we use a dataset of “lucky grants,” which provide a measure of the likelihood of grant dates of CEOs' stock options having been manipulated. Results for both datasets indicate that CEOs who served in the military are less inclined to be involved in fraudulent financial reporting and to backdate stock options. In addition, we find that these relationships are moderated by board oversight (CEO duality and independent directors in the board).