Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences

Ortega, Josué

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URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-482526
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2018
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 18-052
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: C78 , D73,
Keywords (English): Dichotomous preferences , multi-unit assignment , Lorenz dominance , competitive equilibrium with equal incomes
Abstract: I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this set-up, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy- proof. Both solutions are disjoint.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

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