Corporate monitoring by blockholders in Europe : Empirical evidence of managerial disciplining in Belgium, France, Germany and the UK

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URL:	https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/491
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-4911
Document Type:	Working paper
Year of publication:	2001
The title of a journal, publication series:	None
Publication language:	English
Institution:	Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series:	Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject:	330 Economics
Classification:	JEL: G3 G32 ,
Subject headings (SWD):	Westeuropa , Kontrolle , Management , Eigentümer
Abstract:	This study examines managerial disciplining in poorly performing firms using large panels for Belgian, French, German and UK firms. We consider the monitoring role of large blockholders, the market for share blocks, creditors, and non-executive directors. Board restructuring is correlated to poor performance, but not for France. Neither existing blockholders nor creditors play an active role in disciplining. Block purchases have a monitoring role in Belgium and Germany, but not in France and the UK. Large boards facilitate disciplining, but the role of non-executives is ambiguous.
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BASE: Dherment-Ferere, Isabelle ; Köke, F. Jens ; Renneboog, Luc

Google Scholar: Dherment-Ferere, Isabelle ; Köke, F. Jens ; Renneboog, Luc

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