Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations due to a Preference for Equity


Lange, Andreas ; Vogt, Carsten


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/500
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-5002
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2001
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: H41 Q00 C7 D63 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Kooperation , Wirtschaft
Abstract: This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner's dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large fraction or even of all countries can establish a Nash equilibrium. In an emission game, however, where countries can choose their abatement level continuously, equity preferences cannot improve upon the standard inefficient Nash-equilibrium. Finally, in a two stage game on coalition formation, the presence of equity-interested countries increases the coalition size and leads to efficiency gains. Here, even a stable agreement with full cooperation can be reached.
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Lange, Andreas ; Vogt, Carsten (2001) Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations due to a Preference for Equity. Open Access [Working paper]
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