Forward trading and collusion in supply functions


Wölfing, Nikolas


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URL: https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/50019
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-500195
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2019
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 19-003
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Business School > Managerial Accounting (Juniorprofessur) (Wölfing 2019-)
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
License: CC BY 4.0
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: C73 , D43 , L13 , G13,
Abstract: This paper studies the effect of forward contracts on the stability of collusion among firms, competing in supply functions on the spot market. A forward market can increase the range of discount factors which allow to sustain collusion. On the contrary, collusion is destabilised when a potential deviator sells a significant amount forward. Results do not depend on the type (financial or physical) of contract fulfilment and are robust to different levels of demand uncertainty. As a policy implication, the study finds that liquid and anonymous forward markets are incompatible with collusion.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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