Note on the calibration of executive compensation models

DOI:	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1876670
URL:	https://ssrn.com/abstract=1876670
Additional URL:	https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228248796...
Document Type:	Working paper
Year of publication:	2011
The title of a journal, publication series:	SSRN Electronic Journal
Place of publication:	Rochester, NY [u.a.]
Publication language:	English
Institution:	Business School > ABWL, Finanzwirtschaft u. Finanzmarktinstitutionen (Spalt 2019-) Business School > ABWL u. Corporate Finance (Maug)
Subject:	330 Economics
Abstract:	This note is intended for researchers who want to implement the Dittmann and Maug (2007) calibration method. This method allows to test a complete principal-agent model with individual-level data on executive pay. The method consists of two steps. First, the principal-agent model is simplified so that it can be calibrated to the data for an individual CEO. After that, the calibrated model yields predictions about the optimal contract of this CEO, and these predictions can then be compared to observed contracts. This note contains step-by-step instructions on how to replicate the core results of Dittmann and Maug (2007) and Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010). We report intermediate results for an example CEO, so that different parts of the program code can be tested individually.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

BASE: Dittmann, Ingolf ; Zhang, Dan ; Maug, Ernst ; Spalt, Oliver

Google Scholar: Dittmann, Ingolf ; Zhang, Dan ; Maug, Ernst ; Spalt, Oliver

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