Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: the winner's curse


Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von



URL: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/9809.pdf
Additional URL: https://www.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/media/Lehrstuehle/...
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 1998
The title of a journal, publication series: Cahiers de Recherches Économiques
Volume: 98-09
Place of publication: Lausanne
Publishing house: Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie Politique, Université de Lausanne ; HEC
Edition: Rev. 2001
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > VWL, Mikroökonomische Theorie (von Thadden)
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: The purpose of this note is to point out an error in a widely cited paper by Sharpe (1990) on long-term bank-firm relationships and to provide a correct analysis of the problem. The model studies repeated lending under asymmetric information which leads to winner's-curse type distortions of competition. Contrary to the claims in Sharpe (1990), this game only has an equilibriuim in mixed strategies, which features a partial informational lock-in by firms and random termination of lending relationships.

Dieser Datensatz wurde nicht während einer Tätigkeit an der Universität Mannheim veröffentlicht, dies ist eine Externe Publikation.




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Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von (1998) Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: the winner's curse. Cahiers de Recherches Économiques Lausanne 98-09 [Working paper]


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