Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting


Gui, Zhengqing ; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von ; Zhao, Xiaojian



URL: https://core.ac.uk/reader/6330618
Additional URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/pen/papers/10-032.html
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2010
The title of a journal, publication series: PIER Working Paper Archive
Volume: 10-032
Place of publication: Philadelphia, PA
Publishing house: Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > VWL, Mikroökonomische Theorie (von Thadden)
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: We provide several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent's strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977), Glosten (1989), and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), that were not previously covered.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




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Gui, Zhengqing ; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von ; Zhao, Xiaojian (2010) Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting. PIER Working Paper Archive Philadelphia, PA 10-032 [Working paper]


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