Trading and shareholder voting

Levit, Doron ; Malenko, Nadya ; Maug, Ernst

URL:	https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_i...
Weitere URL:	https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_pa...
Dokumenttyp:	Arbeitspapier
Erscheinungsjahr:	2019
Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:	CEPR Discussion Paper
Band/Volume:	14039
Ort der Veröffentlichung:	London
Verlag:	Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Sprache der Veröffentlichung:	Englisch
Einrichtung:	Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > ABWL u. Corporate Finance (Maug 2006-)
Fachgebiet:	330 Wirtschaft
Abstract:	We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. In this model, trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance. We show three main results. First, increasing liquidity and trading opportunities may reduce prices and welfare, because it allows shareholders with more extreme preferences to accumulate large positions and impose their views on more moderate shareholders through voting. Second, prices and welfare can move in opposite directions, which suggests that the former is an invalid proxy for the latter. Third, delegation of the decision to a board of directors may strictly improve shareholder value. However, the optimal board is generally biased, should not be representative of current shareholders, and may not always garner voting support from the majority of shareholders.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

BASE: Levit, Doron ; Malenko, Nadya ; Maug, Ernst

Google Scholar: Levit, Doron ; Malenko, Nadya ; Maug, Ernst

ORCID: Levit, Doron, Malenko, Nadya and Maug, Ernst

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