Expectations of reciprocity when competitors share information: experimental evidence

Ganglmair, Bernhard ; Holcomb, Alex ; Myung, Noah

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URL: https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/52739
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-527395
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2019
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 19-032
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Innovation u. Wettbewerb (Ganglmair 2020-)
Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: O33 , D8 , C72 , C91,
Keywords (English): Knowledge diffusion , information sharing , reciprocity , conversation , experimental economics , centipede game
Abstract: Informal exchange of information among competitors has been well-documented in a variety of industries, and one's expectation of reciprocity shown to be a key determinant. We use an indeterminate horizon centipede game to establish a feedback loop in the laboratory and show that an individual's beliefs about the recipient's intentions to reciprocate matter more than a recipient's ability to do so. This implies that reducing strategic uncertainty about a competitor's behavior has a stronger effect on information ows than reducing environmental uncertainty (about the competitor's ability). We further show results on the formation of beliefs and discuss managerial implications.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

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