philosophy of economics , game theory , epistemology , action theory , philosophy of mind , folk-psychology , public economics , public goods , voluntary provision , demand-rights , collective intentions , legitimacy
Abstract:
The dissertation consists of three essays, one in philosophy of economics and two in public economics. In Chapter 1, I argue that both behaviorism and mentalism fail to take into account the fact that preference revelation is mediated by regulative folk-psychology, a discursive practice used to regulate one’s own as well as others’ behavior. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I support my argument by showing that paying attention to regulative talk can help economists improve their models. To do so, I draw a distinction between legitimate and non-legitimate public goods. Only the legitimate public goods are systematically accompanied by an exertion of a system of demand-rights--a specific form of regulative talk. I develop a theory of public good provision in the presence of legitimate public goods and evaluate its potential to explain some stylized facts of public good experiments.
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