Commitment in first-price auctions


Gillen, Philippe


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URL: https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/54501
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-545011
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2019
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 19-062
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D44 , D47,
Keywords (English): Auctions , experiment
Abstract: We study the role of commitment in a first-price auction environment. We devise a simple two-stage model in which bidders first submit an initial offer that the auctioneer can observe and then make a counteroffer. There is no commitment on the auctioneer's side to accept an offer as is or even to choose the lowest bidder. We compare this setting to a standard first-price auction both theoretically and experimentally. While theory suggests that the offers and the auctioneer's revenue should be higher in a standard first-price auction compared to the first-price auction with renegotiation, we cannot confirm these hypotheses in the experiment.

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Gillen, Philippe (2019) Commitment in first-price auctions. Open Access ZEW Discussion Papers Mannheim 19-062 [Working paper]
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