Expectations of reciprocity when competitors share information: experimental evidence

Ganglmair, Bernhard ; Holcomb, Alex ; Myung, Noah

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.006
URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/...
Additional URL: https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v170y2020icp2...
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2020
The title of a journal, publication series: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization : JEBO
Volume: 170
Page range: 244-267
Place of publication: Amsterdam [u.a.]
Publishing house: Elsevier
ISSN: 0167-2681
Related URLs:
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Innovation u. Wettbewerb (Ganglmair 2020-)
Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: Informal exchange of information among competitors has been well-documented in a variety of industries, and one's expectation of reciprocity shown to be a key determinant. We use an indeterminate horizon centipede game to establish a feedback loop in the laboratory and show that an individual's beliefs about the recipient's intentions to reciprocate matter more than a recipient's ability to do so. This implies that reducing strategic uncertainty about a competitor's behavior has a stronger effect on information ows than reducing environmental uncertainty (about the competitor's ability). We further show results on the formation of beliefs and discuss managerial implications.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

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