In a model of industry standard setting with private information about firms' intellectual property,we analyze (a) firms' incentives to contribute to the development and improvement of a standard, and(b) firms' decision to disclose the existence of relevant intellectual property to other participants ofthe standard-setting process. If participants can disclose after the end of the process and fully exploittheir bargaining leverage, then patent holders aspire to disclose always after the end of the process.However, if a patent holder cannot rely on the other participants to always contribute to the process,then it may be inclined to disclose before the end of the process. We also analyze under which conditionsfirms enter cross-licensing agreements that eliminate the strategic aspect of patent disclosure, andshow that, in an institutional setting that implies a waiver of intellectual property rights if patents arenot disclosed timely, firms aspire to disclose before the end of the process. Finally, we study the effectof product-market competition on patent disclosure.
Dieser Datensatz wurde nicht während einer Tätigkeit an der Universität Mannheim veröffentlicht, dies ist eine Externe Publikation.
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