Patent disclosure in standard setting

Ganglmair, Bernhard ; Tarantino, Emanuele

Additional URL:
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2012
The title of a journal, publication series: NBER Working Paper
Volume: 17999
Place of publication: Cambridge, MA
Publishing house: National Bureau of Economic Research
Related URLs:
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
School of Law and Economics > VWL, Mikroökonomik (Juniorprofessur) (Tarantino 2014-2019)
School of Law and Economics > Innovation u. Wettbewerb (Ganglmair 2020-)
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: In a model of industry standard setting with private information about firms' intellectual property,we analyze (a) firms' incentives to contribute to the development and improvement of a standard, and(b) firms' decision to disclose the existence of relevant intellectual property to other participants ofthe standard-setting process. If participants can disclose after the end of the process and fully exploittheir bargaining leverage, then patent holders aspire to disclose always after the end of the process.However, if a patent holder cannot rely on the other participants to always contribute to the process,then it may be inclined to disclose before the end of the process. We also analyze under which conditionsfirms enter cross-licensing agreements that eliminate the strategic aspect of patent disclosure, andshow that, in an institutional setting that implies a waiver of intellectual property rights if patents arenot disclosed timely, firms aspire to disclose before the end of the process. Finally, we study the effectof product-market competition on patent disclosure.

Dieser Datensatz wurde nicht während einer Tätigkeit an der Universität Mannheim veröffentlicht, dies ist eine Externe Publikation.

Metadata export


+ Search Authors in

+ Page Views

Hits per month over past year

Detailed information

You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail

Actions (login required)

Show item Show item