The curse of knowledge in economic settings: An experimental analysis


Camerer, Colin F. ; Loewenstein, George ; Weber, Martin



DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/261651
URL: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/...
Additional URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/24108678_...
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 1989
The title of a journal, publication series: Journal of Political Economy
Volume: 97
Issue number: 5
Page range: 1232-1254
Place of publication: Chicago, IL
Publishing house: University of Chicago Press
ISSN: 0022-3808 , 1537-534X
Publication language: English
Institution: Business School > ABWL u. Finanzwirtschaft, insbes. Bankbetriebslehre (Weber -2017)
Subject: 150 Psychology
330 Economics
Abstract: In economic analyses of asymmetric information, better-informed agents are assumed capable of reproducing the judgments of less-informed agents. We discuss a systematic violation of this assumption that we call the "curse of knowledge." Better-informed agents are unable to ignore private information even when it is in their interest to do so; more information is not always better. Comparing judgments made in individual-level and market experiments, we find that market forces reduce the curse by approximately 50 percent but do not eliminate it. Implications for bargaining, strategic behavior by firms, principal-agent problems, and choice under uncertainty are discussed.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




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