When shareholders disagree: Trading after shareholder meetings


Li, Sophia Zhengzi ; Maug, Ernst ; Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam



DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhab059
URL: https://academic.oup.com/rfs/advance-article/doi/1...
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2021
The title of a journal, publication series: The Review of Financial Studies
Volume: 35
Issue number: 4
Page range: 1-71
Place of publication: Cary, NC ; New York, NY
Publishing house: Oxford University Press
ISSN: 0893-9454 , 1465-7368
Publication language: English
Institution: Business School > ABWL u. Corporate Finance (Maug 2006-)
Subject: 650 Management
Classification: JEL: G11 , G12 , G14 , G30 , G40,
Abstract: This paper analyzes how trading after shareholder meetings changes the composition of the shareholder base. Analyzing daily trades, we find that mutual funds reduce their holdings if their votes are opposed to the voting outcome. Trading volume is high even when stock prices do not change, peaks on the meeting date, and remains high up to four weeks after shareholder meetings. The results support models based on differences of opinion that predict that shareholders’ beliefs may diverge more after observing voting outcomes. Hence, trading after meetings creates a more homogeneous shareholder base, which has important implications for corporate governance.




Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




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