Bildung , Ausbildung , Lohn , Steuer , Föderalismus
Abstract:
We analyze a two-period model where risk-averse students divide their time between risky education, leisure and work. The educated can migrate. Wage-tax financed transfer to students acts as an insurance, and increases both investment in education and demand for leisure. We derive sufficient conditions for tax competition to lead to too low wage tax rates. We suggest, that the educated should pay their wage taxes to the region which has financed their education, and would benefit also the owners of the complementary factor.
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