Mandated sick pay: Coverage, utilization, and welfare effects


Maclean, Catherine ; Pichler, Stefan ; Ziebarth, Nicolas R.


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URL: https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/61101
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-611012
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2021
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 21-083
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: I12 , I18 , J22 , J28 , J32 , J38 , J88 , H75,
Keywords (English): sick pay mandates , take-up , social insurance , fringe benefits , moral hazard , unintended consequences , medical leave , National Compensation Survey , optimal social insurance , Baily-Chetty , welfare
Abstract: This paper evaluates how sick pay mandates operate at the job level in the United States. Using the National Compensation Survey and difference-in-differences models, we estimate their impact on coverage rates, sick leave use, labor costs, and non-mandated fringe benefits. Sick pay mandates increase coverage significantly by 18 percentage points from a baseline level of 66% in the first two years. Newly covered employees take two additional sick days per year. We find little evidence that mandating sick pay crowds-out non-mandated fringe benefits. Finally, we develop a model of optimal sick pay provision and illustrate the trade-offs when assessing welfare.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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