Mandated sick pay: Coverage, utilization, and welfare effects
Maclean, Catherine
;
Pichler, Stefan
;
Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
URL:
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https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/61101
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URN:
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urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-611012
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Document Type:
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Working paper
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Year of publication:
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2021
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The title of a journal, publication series:
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ZEW Discussion Papers
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Volume:
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21-083
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Place of publication:
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Mannheim
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Publication language:
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English
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Institution:
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Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
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MADOC publication series:
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Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
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Subject:
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330 Economics
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Classification:
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JEL:
I12 , I18 , J22 , J28 , J32 , J38 , J88 , H75,
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Keywords (English):
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sick pay mandates , take-up , social insurance , fringe benefits , moral hazard , unintended consequences , medical leave , National Compensation Survey , optimal social insurance , Baily-Chetty , welfare
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Abstract:
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This paper evaluates how sick pay mandates operate at the job level in the United States. Using the National Compensation Survey and difference-in-differences models, we estimate their impact on coverage rates, sick leave use, labor costs, and non-mandated fringe benefits. Sick pay mandates increase coverage significantly by 18 percentage points from a baseline level of 66% in the first two years. Newly covered employees take two additional sick days per year. We find little evidence that mandating sick pay crowds-out non-mandated fringe benefits. Finally, we develop a model of optimal sick pay provision and illustrate the trade-offs when assessing welfare.
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 | Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt. |
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