Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence : Evidence from the U.S.


Esteller-Moré, Álex ; Solé-Ollé, Albert


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/615
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-6154
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 1999
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: H21 H77 H3 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Steuerpolitik , Steuerwettbewerb , Einkommensteuer , Regierung
Abstract: Concurrent taxation is a feature of many federal systems. As a consequence of this fact, the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other. This paper carries out a theoretical analysis of the interdependent tax-setting decisions of federal and regional governments, paying special attention to institutional features that characterise the U.S. federal system in practice and that formally link the taxes employed at various levels of government (i.e.: tax deductibility). The developed hypotheses are tested with data corresponding to the U.S. personal income taxes for the last decade. We find that when the federal government increases taxes, there is a significant positive response of regional taxes.
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Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Esteller-Moré, Álex ; Solé-Ollé, Albert (1999) Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence : Evidence from the U.S. Open Access [Working paper]
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