Inequality and social security expenditures have been rising over the past decades. Hence, policymakers face pressure to address these issues relating to a classical problem in public economics: the design and evaluation of policies aimed at alleviating inequality and providing social insurance. Designing effective policies requires a firm understanding of the underlying mechanisms, i.e., the causes of inequality and individuals’ responses to policy changes. This dissertation makes progress in understanding these causes and responses by studying three different policy instruments addressing said issues. The first chapter studies the causal effect of pay transparency on the wage gap in Austria, showing zero effects. The second chapter investigates how private and public disability insurance interact and what this interaction implies for the design of welfare-enhancing public policies. The final chapter studies whether certain aspects of the public disability insurance system can be efficiently privatized. While the results show that privatization is efficient, equity concerns or risk misperceptions of agents still call for a public mandate.
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