How to improve payroll tax compliance of small firms? Evidence from a randomized field experiment


Dörrenberg, Philipp ; Pfrang, Alina ; Schmitz, Jan



URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_i...
Dokumenttyp: Arbeitspapier
Erscheinungsjahr: 2022
Ort der Veröffentlichung: Rochester, NY
Verlag: SSRN
Sprache der Veröffentlichung: Englisch
Einrichtung: Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > ABWL u. Betriebswirtschaftliche Steuerlehre II (Spengel 2006-)
Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > ABWL u. Betriebswirtschaftliche Steuerlehre (Dörrenberg 2019-)
Fachgebiet: 330 Wirtschaft
Fachklassifikation: JEL: H20 , H32 , H50 , C93,
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch): tax compliance , firms , audits , morale appeals , randomized field experiment
Abstract: Improving tax compliance of firms can substantially increase tax revenues. Cooperating with the Bulgarian tax authorities, we conducted a randomized field experiment to assess means for improving tax compliance of small firms in an emerging economy. We tested the effect of deterrence messages by randomizing the individual audit probability of firms (1%, 10%, 40% or 60%) and tested a novel form of moral appeals by varying information on the benefits of tax-financed public goods provided to firms. Our focus is on payroll taxes which is rarely studied in existing tax-compliance work. Using administrative tax return data with monthly frequency, we show that both deterrence measures and moral appeals significantly improve payroll tax compliance. The treatment effect of a high audit probability was approximately 50\% larger than the effect of moral appeals. Treatment effects in general were significantly larger for larger firms and in labor-intensive industries. Cost-benefit analysis shows that the experiment-induced tax revenue gains considerably outweighed the costs of the experiment.




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