Corporate profitability and the global persistence of corruption


Ferris, Stephen P. ; Hanousek, Jan ; Tresl, Jiri


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101855
URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/...
Additional URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347899853...
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-631565
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2021
The title of a journal, publication series: Journal of Corporate Finance
Volume: 66
Issue number: Article 101855
Page range: 1-18
Place of publication: Amsterdam [u.a.]
Publishing house: Elsevier
ISSN: 0929-1199
Publication language: English
Institution: Business School > ABWL, Finanzwirtschaft u. Finanzmarktinstitutionen (Spalt 2019-)
Pre-existing license: Creative Commons Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
Subject: 650 Management
Abstract: We examine the persistence of corporate corruption for a sample of privately-held firms from 12 Central and Eastern European countries from 2001 to 2015. Using publicly available information and stochastic frontier analysis, we create a proxy for corporate corruption based on a firm's internal inefficiency. We find that corruption enhances a firm's profitability. A channel analysis further reveals that inflating staff costs is the most common approach by which firms divert funds to finance corruption. In spite of corruption's negative effects on a country's economy, we conclude that it persists because of its ability to improve corporate profitability. We refer to this effect as the Corporate Advantage Hypothesis.




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