Congestion management games in electricity markets

Erhart, Karl-Martin ; Eicke, Anselm ; Hirth, Lion ; Ocker, Fabian ; Ott, Marion ; Schlecht, Ingmar

[img] PDF
dp22060.pdf - Published

Download (992kB)

URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-637614
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2022
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 22-060
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D43 , D44 , L13 , Q41 , Q48,
Keywords (English): Energy market , game theory , auctions/bidding , congestion management , Inc-dec gaming
Abstract: This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of incdec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors’ costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these extensions do not dissolve inc-dec gaming, which already occurs in our setup of two regions. We also benchmark market-based redispatch against grid investment, cost-based redispatch, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The comparison highlights a significant inefficiency of market-based redispatch and inflated redispatch payments. Finally, we study seven variations of our basic model to assess whether different market fundamentals or market design changes mitigate inc-dec gaming. None of these variations eliminate inc-dec gaming entirely

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

Metadata export


+ Search Authors in

+ Download Statistics

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail

Actions (login required)

Show item Show item